

SECURITY INFORMATION

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

13 August 1953

SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE-98: COMMUNIST COURSES OF ACTION  
IN THE FAR EAST THROUGH MID-1955

## THE PROBLEM

To estimate probable Communist courses of action in the Far East\*  
through mid-1955.

## QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

Note: This estimate is undertaken in conjunction with NIE-90: Soviet Bloc Capabilities through mid-1955; and NIE-95: Probable Soviet Bloc Courses of Action through mid-1955, both of which are scheduled to be published during the third quarter of 1953. NIE-90 will cover Communist military and political warfare capabilities in the Far East. NIE-95 will attempt, with reference to the capabilities and strengths enumerated in NIE-90 and other considerations, to estimate the general course of Soviet Bloc policy through mid-1955.

\* Countries included in the Far East: Japan, North and South Korea, Communist China, Formosa, Philippines, Indochina, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaya, Burma, Ceylon, and India.

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The purpose of this estimate is to examine the probable Communist courses of action in the Far East under the over-all Bloc policies as estimated in NIE-95 and within the limits of Communist capabilities as estimated in NIE-90. It is hoped, therefore, that the contributions to this estimate can be restricted to a discussion of probable courses of action, except to the extent that reference to capabilities or strengths is essential to the argument or to the extent that more recent developments necessitate revisions of the coordinated text of NIE-90 and its appendices.

A. Soviet and Chinese Communist Objectives

1. What are specific Communist objectives in the Far East during the period of this estimate?
2. What divergencies, if any, exist between the objectives of Communist China and the USSR?

B. Factors Affecting Communist Courses of Action in the Far East.

1. What is the current status and what are the probable developments during the period of this estimate in Communist armed forces in the Far East, with particular reference to:

- a. the readiness of the Communist armed forces in North Korea, Communist China, and the Democratic Republic of

Viet Nam to engage, individually or collectively, in aggressive action within the regional theatre;

b. the ability of Communist para-military and guerrilla units in Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Thailand, Malaya, Indonesia, Burma, and India to:

- 1) harass or overthrow existing governments; or
- 2) support an external Communist attack on their respective countries?

c. the readiness of the Soviet Union to assist Communist forces in the Far East to accomplish the courses of action in a and b above.

2. What is the current economic situation and what are the probable economic developments expected in the Far Eastern Communist countries during the period of this estimate, with particular reference to:

- a. economic ability of the existing Communist countries of the Far East to support military operations, locally and in a larger regional theatre;
- b. economic ability of the existing Communist countries of the Far East to support economic and political warfare against non-Communist countries in the region; and

c. economic ability of the Soviet Union to assist the Communist countries of the Far East to achieve a and b above as well as to contribute to their economic development?

3. What is the current political situation and what are the probable political developments expected during the period of this estimate, with particular reference to:

- a. the stability, organization, and orientation of Communist governments in North Korea, Communist China, and the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam;
- b. the political strength of Communist movements in the non-Communist countries of the Far East; and
- c. the ability of the Soviet Union and Communist China to assist the indigenous Communist movements in the non-Communist countries in the Far East in waging political warfare against the existing governments?

4. What is the existing relationship between the Soviet Union and Communist China and what developments are expected during the period of this estimate, with particular reference to:

- a. the influence of the Chinese Communists in the formation of Communist policies in the Far East;
- b. the exercise of direction of the Communist movement in the countries of the Far East (other than Communist China)?

5. In the determination of Communist policy, how important is:

a. the Communist estimate of US policies in the Far East during the period of this estimate?

b. the Communist estimate of possible US reaction to the following developments:

- 1) A Communist violation of a Korean armistice by a resumption of hostilities?
- 2) A considerable increase in Chinese Communist material assistance to the Viet Minh; the provision of Chinese Communist rear-area service units to the Viet Minh, including antiaircraft artillery units?
- 3) A decisive Viet Minh victory resulting from large Chinese Communist material and/or service forces assistance?
- 4) A Chinese Communist invasion of Indochina?
- 5) A Communist offer to negotiate a "peaceful" settlement in Indochina?
- 6) Large-scale Chinese Communist material assistance to the Burmese guerrillas; movement of Chinese Communist forces into Burma?
- 7) Chinese Communist supported and directed guerrilla activities on large-scale in Thailand?

- 8) Communist attempted invasion of Taiwan?
- 9) An intensified peace offensive, including economic and political concessions and inducements in the Far East with particular reference to Japan?

C. What Indications Can Be Derived from the Following Specific Developments as to Future Communist Courses of Action in the Far East?

1. The death of Stalin, the removal of Beria, and other personnel changes in the Soviet Union; personnel changes in the European satellites, Communist China, and North Korea.
2. Communist willingness to conclude an armistice in Korea.
3. The decision on the part of the Chinese Communists to lower the goals of their program of economic development.
4. The substantial increase in Chinese Communist assistance to the Viet-Minh beginning in 1953.
5. The Viet Minh invasion of Laos at a time when world Communism was speaking of "peace" and acting to reduce international tensions.
6. Apparent change in the tactics of the Communists in Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaya over the past two years to policies emphasizing for the most part non-violent political and propaganda efforts to increase Communist political power and popular support.

7. Communist Chinese attacks on the offshore islands during the spring and summer of 1953.

8. Apparent efforts of the Soviet Union and Communist China to increase its trade with Japan.

9. The formation of the "Thai Autonomous Area" in Communist China.

10. Soviet and Polish offers to contribute to the UN technical assistance program.

11. Other specific developments.

D. Communist Courses of Action in the Far East.

1. What are the probable Communist courses of action in the individual countries of the Far East and for the region as a whole during the period of this estimate?

2. How might these courses of action be modified or changed by the following contingencies:

a. Major developments in the implementation of the armistice and in the course of the political conference, particularly:

1) ROK breaking of the truce by renewing hostilities.

2) ROK unilateral withdrawal from the political conference

before agreement has been reached for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea; ROK and US joint withdrawal.

b. A major shift in US policy, either becoming more aggressive or more conciliatory than Communist estimate in Section C 5 above.

c. An open split between the US and its allies over Far Eastern policies.

d. French offer to negotiate with the Communists to end Indochina conflict.

e. Vigorous Japanese efforts to renew traditional trade with the Asian mainland.

f. Initiation of military action by Nationalist China against Communist China.